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MinireviewSocial Attention and the BrainJeffrey T. Klein1, Stephen V. Shepherd2,
and Michael L. Platt1,3,4
Humans and other animals pay attention to othermembers
of their groups to acquire valuable social information about
them, including information about their identity, domi-
nance, fertility, emotions, and likely intent. In primates,
attention to other group members and the objects of their
attention is mediated by neural circuits that transduce
sensory information about others and translate that infor-
mation into value signals that bias orienting. This process
likely proceeds via two distinct but integrated pathways:
an ancestral, subcortical route that mediates crude but
fast orienting to animate objects and faces; and a more
derived route involving cortical orienting circuits that
mediate nuanced and context-dependent social attention.
When Barack Obama walks into a room, all eyes are on him.
So too for Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt, but no less so for the
chair of a biology department at faculty meeting or the
captain of the basketball team at a pep rally. Looking at
others is an important and natural feature of our everyday
life — so much so that when others fail to meet our gaze
we immediately sense that something is wrong. Clearly, at
whom we look — and how — betrays much about our own
identity: who we are, where we come from, our gender,
age, and social status. Although these aspects of social
attention seem, at first glance, fundamentally human, they
are also biological features with deep evolutionary roots.
Indeed, a hallmark of primate evolution is an increasing reli-
ance on vision to guide behavior. Such visually-guided
behaviors include the discovery and selection of high-quality
foods, recognition and pursuit of receptive mates, identifica-
tion and solicitation of potential allies, the detection of pred-
ators, and avoidance of social threats [1].
As a direct result, how biologically alive an object appears
(its ‘animacy’) strongly predicts how much it attracts visual
inspection [2,3]. When confronted with a visual scene in the
laboratory while lacking a predefined task or instruction, we
generally look toward objects with social importance, namely
individuals, their faces, and especially their eyes (humans [2];
monkeys [4]). This orienting bias arises almost immediately
after the stimuli appear, within a lag as short as 120 ms, and
is evident in the first glance [5]. Two cues seem to drive fast
identification of animate objects: faces, particularly the
paired concentric circles comprising the eyes [6]; and irreg-
ular motion [7]. Eyes may be especially important not just
as a potent indicator of animacy, but also as an indicator of
affective, attentional and intentional state [6].
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understood at a mechanistic level, both ancestral subcor-
tical and more derived neocortical circuits likely play impor-
tant roles (Figure 1). Specifically, subcortical circuits —
believed to run from the superior colliculus through the pul-
vinar to the amygdala, though direct anatomical confirmation
is lacking — appear to serve as an ‘early warning’ system
providing a crude but fast description of animate objects
[8] and the foci of their attention [9]. Complementing this
system, neocortical circuits, perhaps developing under the
guidance of subcortical systems [10], further facilitate social
attention. These include processing of social identity and
expression in the fusiform gyrus and superior temporal
sulcus [11], and observed gaze in the superior temporal
sulcus [12–14] and posterior parietal lobe [12,15].
Social Information Reinforces Attention
For vision to guide behavior effectively, an animal must
decide where to look, how long to look there, and whether
to spend time in continued observation or instead devote
visual processing to online guidance of other behaviors (for
example [3]). The rich literature on neural mechanisms of
visual orienting decisions sheds light on how the brain
accomplishes this task.
Neurons in several brain areas, including the lateral intra-
parietal area (LIP), prefrontal cortex, superior colliculus,
basal ganglia and posterior cingulate cortex, signal the pre-
dicted value of orienting toward a particular object for fluid
rewards (reviewed in [16]). Modulation of neural responses
to stimuli by their value likely serves to bias the visual orient-
ing system toward shifting gaze to the most important among
objects in the visual field [17]. While these types of study have
yielded useful insight into the neural mechanisms underlying
decision-making more generally, they are limited in that the
expected rewards in the laboratory are typically food or juice,
while in the natural world, the ‘reward’ for orienting is useful
visual information. Indeed, one of the most fundamental,
and often overlooked, aspects of social behavior is the
intrinsic reinforcement that motivates attention to others.
To explore the contribution of social information value to
visual orienting, we took advantage of the natural tendencies
of monkeys and other primates, including humans, to look
toward other individuals and the objects of their attention
[6,18]. We specifically tested the idea that value-based
scaling of neural target signals extends spontaneously, in
the absence of training, to socially-informative stimuli [19].
The orienting behavior of male rhesus macaques and the
responses of neurons in LIP were simultaneously studied
using a ‘pay-per-view’ orienting choice task. Monkeys first
fixated on a central square on a dark computer monitor,
then two yellow squares were illuminated, one in the
response field of an LIP neuron being recorded and the other
directly opposite. Choosing the target in the response field
was rewarded with a drop of juice and a picture of a familiar
monkey, while choosing the other target was rewarded only
with juice. The relative amount of juice reward associated
with the two targets and identity of the monkeys in the
pictures were varied across conditions.
We estimated the reinforcement value of social images



















Figure 1. Connectivity of social (red), reward
(blue), and orienting (green) cortical areas
governing social attention.
In addition to the cortical pathway, a fast
subcortical pathway connects superior colli-
culus to amygdala via the thalamus (not
shown here). Note that multiple social pro-
cessing areas lie along superior temporal
sulcus, occupying both posterior and anterior
temporal lobe, and that functional activity in
imaging tasks has not been conclusively inte-
grated with past anatomical or electrophysio-
logical studies. PPC, posterior parietal cortex,
including macaque areas 7A and LIP; STS,
superior temporal sulcus regions; SEF, sup-
plementary eye fields; FEF, frontal eye fields;
OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; AMYG, amygdala.
desirability of a juice reward (compare
[20]). Generally, male monkeys valued
orienting to images of high-ranking
males and female sexual signals (these
images substitute for fluid rewards) but
did not value orienting to images of
subordinate males (monkeys must be
paid extra juice to view these image).
Importantly, LIP neurons responded
most strongly when monkeys chose
to view images of dominant male faces or female sexual
signals, but responded weakly when the expected outcome
was the face of a subordinate male (Figure 2). This scaling of
attention-related neuronal activity by social reward value
precisely paralleled value-based scaling of neuronal activity
by fluid rewards.
There are at least two important theoretical implications of
this finding. First, it indicates that the sensitivity of neurons in
the visual orienting system to conditioned juice rewards
generalizes to more naturalistic, socially-relevant outcomes.
Second, juice value and social value are encoded simulta-
neously and in the same manner by LIP neurons, suggesting
that sundry information about the value of attending to
different objects and events in the environment is collapsed
into a common currency before it reaches LIP. Furthermore,
it seems clear that this common currency represents impor-
tance rather than valence (attractiveness). In our pay-per-
view task, monkeys preferred to orient to both female sexual
signals and the faces of dominant males. After choosing to
orient to dominant male faces, however, they rapidly looked
away — likely because sustained eye contact between
macaques is a threat and provocation [21]. This finding
suggests different motivations for looking at sexual signals
and high-status faces. While sexual signals initiate approach
behavior for obvious reasons, orienting to the faces of domi-
nant males is partially motivated by threat assessment that
may instigate retreat. LIP neurons nonetheless responded
strongly to both types of images, suggesting a role in orient-
ing to socially-relevant stimuli rather than signaling the plea-
sure derived from doing so. Thus, the common currency of
orienting value, as observed in LIP, integrates factors span-
ning both outcome modality (in this case social and nutritive)
and outcome valence (positive or negative).
We speculate that the common currency of target value
observed in LIP will be observed in other areas associated
with visual orienting. This supposition is based on two
arguments. First, the similarities in fluid reward coding
discovered in the brain areas mentioned above implies
a redundant representation of orienting value across the
visual orienting system. The second argument is an appeal
to parsimony: primates can only overtly orient toward one
location at a time, and attention control mechanisms must
unambiguously select a single target location to prevent
conflict between alternative motor plans. Thus, a representa-
tion of orienting value that generalizes across affective
valence and outcome modality would most efficiently guide
attention and orienting within natural environments, in which
energetic, social, sexual, and other factors must be balanced
to adaptively guide behavior.
Computing Social Orienting Value
Despite a dearth of research directly addressing how social
information is incorporated in a common currency to guide
attention, several studies using a variety of non-social
outcomes suggest the importance of the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) and striatum in the process. These reports have sug-
gested that the OFC transforms reward and punishment infor-
mation into a common currency of subjective value, in which
arbitrary options can be compared. Indeed, electrophysiolog-
ical studies have demonstrated that neurons in OFC signal
several types of information essential to computinga common
currency for decision, including information related to subjec-
tive preference among different fluid rewards, flavor-specific
satiety, and aversive outcomes (reviewed in [22]).
These observations suggest that OFC neurons link pre-
dicted rewards to state variables, including both internal
(motivation and satiety) and external (alternatives, opportu-
nity costs) factors that impact the subjective value of an
action. In contrast to the value-related modulations of
neuronal activity in LIP and the superior colliculus (reviewed
in [16]), primate OFC neurons encode the abstract value of
available options independently of the visuospatial and
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Figure 2. The LIP population response simultaneously encodes social image value and fluid value during a ‘pay-per-view’ choice task.
(A) Average firing rate for 34 neurons plotted against time for all trials in which the subject chose to view the image (T2) in the neuron’s response field,
separated by image class. Inset: values determined for different image classes for two male monkey subjects (open and closed bars), in ms of fluid
delivery time. Positive deflections indicate the subject was willing to forgo fluid to view that image class. Negative deflections indicate the subject
required fluid overpayment to choose that image class. Hindquarters refers to the perineal sexual signals of familiar females. Dominant and subor-
dinate refer to the faces of familiar dominant and subordinate males. Gray refers to a plain gray square matched for size and luminance to the other
image classes. (B) Average firing rate of the population for all trials in which the subject chose to view the image (T2) in the neuron’s response field,
separated by fluid value relative to the non-chosen target (T1). (C) Firing rates plotted as a function of image value in four 200 ms epochs. Black
symbols represent regressions performed on all data in which the subject chose to view the image, and gray symbols represent the same analysis
restricted to trials in which the fluid payoff forchoosingT1 was equal toT2. (D)Firing ratesplottedas a function of thedifference influid payoff between
T2 and T1. Black symbols represent regression performed on all data in which the subject chose to view the image, and gray symbols represent the
same analysis restricted to trials in which the image value calculated for that block was greater than -5 and less than 5 ms. Error bars represent SEM.
The data in (C,D) were binned for display, but all regressions were performed on raw data. *p < 0.05, **p < 1023. (Adapted with permission from [19].)motor contingencies of the task [22] (or at least do so while
choices are made [23]).
TheOFC iswell-situatedanatomically topassabstract value
information to executive systems which, in turn, translate this
information into the spatially specific representation of target
value observed in LIP, the superior colliculus and other areas,
doing so both directly and via projections to the ventral stria-
tum (VS), which in turn projects via the thalamus to other areas
of cortex [24]. Several lines of evidence demonstrate that this
circuitry encodes behaviorally-relevant social information, in
addition to other types of rewards. For example, neuroimaging
studies have demonstrated the OFC and VS respond to
socially reinforcing stimuli such as beautiful or smiling faces
[25], while OFC lesions disrupt interpersonal behavior [26].
Similarly, neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that
both the ventral and dorsal striatum respond to more complex
social information, such as cooperation with a human partner
or the opportunity to punish a traitor (see [27] for a review of
social economic games and their neural correlates).
Additionally, the amygdala likely plays an important role in
calculating and updating social orienting value. Recent
human imaging work has demonstrated a complex, region-
ally- and temporally-specific amygdala response to social
conditioning. The medial ventral amygdala has an initially
strong, but quickly habituating, response to faces which
predicts social outcome regardless of valence (positive,negative or neutral); the lateral ventral amygdala responds
strongly to negatively valenced outcomes without apparent
habituation; and the dorsal amygdala responds to both
positive and negative outcomes with response magnitude
decreasing over time [28]. The amygdala likely interacts with
the striatum and OFC in creating and monitoring social value,
as it shares dense connections with both structures [29,30].
Joint Attention and Gaze Following
Attending to another animal can potentially reveal several
types of useful information, such as its species, gender,
age, health, and affective state. One of these signals, gaze
direction, is remarkable in that it redirects attention away
from the observed individual and toward the locus of their
attention. Even for minimally social animals, observed gaze
direction may usefully predict the movement trajectories of
both predators and prey. Moreover, because group-living
animals share an overlapping goal set — eating similar
foods, avoiding similar predators — the behavioral states
of other individuals can provide useful information. Reading
the intentions of other individuals can help localize food
sources and coordinate group movements, while reading
their attention can speed threat-detection and anti-predator
behavior. Finally, group-living animals in complex societies
may learn about the intentions and dispositions of others









































Figure 3. LIP neurons mirror observed gaze.
(A) Gaze following in macaques. An image of a monkey face with averted gaze (cue) was displayed centrally for 100, 200, 400 or 800 ms. Next, the
cue was extinguished simultaneously with the appearance of a peripheral target located in the direction the of gaze of the cue (congruent condi-
tion) or directly opposite (incongruent condition). Monkeys then immediately shifted gaze to the peripheral target to receive a fluid reward. For cue
durations%400 ms the congruent condition elicited reaction time savings compared to the incongruent condition, indicating a shift of attention.
Error bars represent SEM across sessions. (B) Neural cue responses in LIP. Significant neuronal responses to observed gaze direction in 10 ms
bins. Neurons with firing rates enhanced by cues with gaze directed at their response fields (red) are temporally clustered in the time windows for
which gaze-following behavior is strongest. Those neurons with firing rates suppressed by cues with gaze directed toward their response fields
maintain tonic decreases in activity throughout the fixation period. (Adapted with permission from [15].)For all of these reasons, group-living animals should both
attend and often ‘mirror’ the attentional state of others, and
their attention systems should be likewise influenced by
social cues that transmit information about the attention
and intentions of others [6]. Among humans, for example,
our tendency to reflexively follow gaze may play an espe-
cially important role in language development [31].
Our sensitivity to others’ gaze is two-fold: more urgently,
we sense when we are being watched; more subtly, we sense
the referent of observed gaze within our shared environment,
discriminating between distal regions which are, or are not,
the focus of another’s attention. There is overwhelming
evidence that the first manner of sensitivity to gaze direction
— sensitivity to being watched — is both innate [32] and
shared by most vertebrates [33]. The second manner of
sensitivity to gaze direction, however — the use of gaze as
a referential cue — remains somewhat mysterious. It is clear
that both humans and many animals [6] follow the gaze of
others with their own. Furthermore, the shared psychophys-
ical features of gaze following in humans and macaques indi-
cate that the behaviors share similar neural mechanisms [18].
While gaze following appears fairly reflexive in humans and
other primates (for example [18]), its sensitivity to social
context suggests that the underlying mechanisms are not
strictly modular but rather deeply enmeshed with other
aspects of social information processing (reviewed in [34]).
For example, just as they will sacrifice more juice to look at
dominant males [19,20], rhesus monkeys are also more likely
to follow their gaze [35]. There also appears to be important
individual variation in socially-cued orienting. For example,
men typically follow gaze less than women do, suggesting
that sex hormones may influence development of this
system [36]. Together with decreased social orienting by
high-status monkeys relative to low-status monkeys, these
findings may suggest a suppressive role for testosterone
[35]. Notably, a failure to seek or respond to joint attention
is a crucial diagnostic feature of autism, which is much
more prevalent in males than females [37].
Several brain areas have been identified as especially
important for attention to the gaze of others. First, neurons
near the superior temporal sulcus in monkeys and humansare selective for dynamic features of facial expression,
including gaze direction [14], and the most anterior of these
neuronal populations appears to be sensitive to the explicit
direction in which individuals look [13]. Second, neurons in
the amygdala are sensitive to gaze direction [9] and may
mediate attention to the eye region [38]. Finally, the posterior
parietal cortex may contribute to the redirection of attention
by observed gaze: Neurons in posterior parietal cortex are
sensitive to the direction of observed gaze [12], and, in
monkey LIP, respond both when the monkey looks toward
a region of space and when the monkey observes another
monkey doing the same [15] (Figure 3).
Deception and Covert Attention
Because many social animals follow the gaze of others,
overtly attending to desired objects may impose substantial
costs in competitive interactions, for example by revealing
rare resources or predicting imminent behaviors. Though
humans may have evolved especially readable eyes [39],
primate gaze comprehension is generally more pronounced
in competitive than cooperative contexts [40]. The costs and
benefits of social signaling with the eyes may have led to
an evolutionary arms race favoring deceptive orienting
behavior. In particular, the ability to covertly attend objects
and events in the environment, while overtly fixating else-
where, could help to obscure sensitive information.
Humans clearly can, with some difficulty, divide their atten-
tion amongst multiple locations in a scene [41]. Macaques are
often trained in the laboratory to attend to peripheral targets
without moving their eyes; but to our knowledge, covert
attention has never been systematically studied in other
animals. The ability to divide attention may have evolved, in
part, to solve the social problem of hiding intent. Neurophys-
iological studies demonstrate that covert and overt attention
depend on overlapping brain systems, thus reinforcing the
notion that covert attention evolved in some species from
more ubiquitous mechanisms underlying overt orienting
[42]. Further comparative studies of covert and overt atten-
tion, specifically contrasting species that differ in social
competition, will be needed to test whether the ability to
read gaze promotes the evolution of covert attention.
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Social interaction is a foundation to our way of life and a yard-
stick by which we measure its quality, but the fundamental
mechanisms that guide our social relationships have deep
evolutionary roots. We extract key information from the
social environment by orienting toward important individuals
and subsequently to the objects of their attention. This ori-
enting bias arises both through reflexive subcortical path-
ways shared by most vertebrates, and through more subtle,
nuanced, and context-dependent pathways in primates and
presumably other mammals and birds. These orienting
biases play an important role in human cognition and
behavior, including language acquisition, and are vulnerable
to disruption in disorders such as autism and social anxiety.
Understanding individual and species differences in the
neural mechanisms that mediate social attention, the genetic
origins of these differences, and their implications for differ-
ences in social behavior and social structure will require
further comparative study using naturalistic, ecologically-
valid social contexts (see [43] for hurdles in investigating
social interaction in the laboratory). Doing so will further
demand deeper understanding of orienting behavior in the
real world, outside the confines of the laboratory [43]. The
neuroethological approach advocated here, involving active
collaboration between psychologists, geneticists, ecolo-
gists and neurobiologists, provides a strong rationale for
optimism that the complex and dynamic interactions that
characterize social behavior — and which characterized
our species’ evolution — will become more tractable targets
for experimental and mechanistic inquiry.
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